goes against their current interpretation.
The other object will be to consider whether one of the arguments given in our Fundamentals o f Symbolic Logic rests "on a misunderstanding of important features of empirical discourse."*. It is important to look into the linguistic charge, especially because of the increasing role the investigation of language has been playing in recent philosophy. The following compressed version of the argument was selected for criticism:
" (I) `Given any set of four propositions answering to the forms ,
A, E, I, 0, it is plain that at least one of them must be true' ...and ' the underlying assumption is such that one of the two particulars I and 0 must be true'....
(II) 'Both I and 0 (where the A, E, I, 0 propositions are taken to be "All ogres are wicked," etc.) imply that there are ogres'.
From which the authors draw their conclusions :
(III) 'Hence given that one of the four propositions about ogres must be true and that every one of them implies that there must be ogres, then there are no conceivable circumstances under which "There are ogres" will be false. This is to say that "There are ogres" is neces- any one of the A, E, I, 0 forms must be hypothetical: they tell us only if 0 is false then I must be true, if A is true then I must be true, etc.
Of course we might say, e.g., of the contradictory forms A and 0, E and I, `One of them must be true,' but this would be a loose idiom for `If either is true then the other must be false, and _if either if false the other must be true.' Accordingly instead of (I) the authors are entitled only to assert :
(IA) `Given any set of propositions of the forms A, E, I, 0, it is plain that if one or more are false one of them at least must be true'
and 'the underlying assumption is such that i f one of two particulars I and 0 is false the other must be true.'
Now if this simple and vital correction of (I) to (IA There is reason to think that anyone who holds that (Ex). fx is a necessary condition for a general proposition's having a truth-value also holds, implicitly if not in so many words, that it is a sufficient condition.
Strawson says*** "...the question whether sentences of the A, E, I, O forms are being used to make true or false assertions does not arise except when the existential condition is fulfilled for the subject term."
It is plain that if he falsity of (Ex To limit the discussion again to the explicitly made claim that a necessary condition for a set of statements on the square having a truthvalue is that their subject-term denotes a truth-value is a fact to the effect that nothing answers to its subject- has its own difficulties. If "Some ogres are wicked" and "Some ogres are not wicked" are to count as neither true nor false, then it must be denied that these entail that there are ogres. In general, a statement of the form (Ex). fx is denied to be a necessary condition of the truth of I and 0, so that the nonexistence of f's will not determine statements of the I and O forms to the truth-value falsity even though they are affairs. It would thus seem to be a priori, and to make an entailment claim to the effect that being a piece of fiction entails having no truthvalue. Or to put it somewhat differently, being fictional and either true or false is a contradiction. It is hard to think that if this is a contradiction some philosophers would see it and others persistently fail to see it. We get a better view of the nature of the philosophical disagreement if we consider the parallel verbal claim and counterclaim : (1) the phrase "has a truth -value" applies to nothing to which "is fictional" applies , and (2) the phrase "has a truth-value" does apply to what "fictional" applies to. If someone were to spin a tale out of his imagination, and it was discovered that the story corresponded in every particular to The explanation of the philosophical disagreement that suggests itself is that it is not a disagreement about matter of actual usage but is instead a disagreement over the introduction of an academically reedited use of "has a truth-value." A philosopher who holds that fictional statements are neither true nor false wishes to mark a difference, which he feels to be important, between fictional statements and statements made "seriously." What he is particularly concerned to highlight is the difference in intention between using language to create fiction and using language to report or misreport fact, the difference, roughly, in the one case being to beguile and in the other to inform or deceive. And the philosophical logician marks the difference with the help of an artificially contracted use of "has a truth-value."
We may say that in his language game the term applies to nonfictional statements and is withheld from fictional statements. 
